

Date:10/01/93
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10228

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R2146

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/AND EXHIBITS AS LISTED

DATE : 01/10/76
PAGES : 96

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY OF E. HOWARD HUNT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/01/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 248-10

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SSCI BOX 2 248-10

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County of Okaloosa)

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
E. HOWARD HUNT, JR., being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. On January 10, 1976, I was examined by Frederick D. Baron, a counsel for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. On January 11, 1976, I was examined by both Mr. Baron and Howard Liebengood, another counsel for the Senate Select Committee. At both of these examinations I was accompanied by my counsel, Randall C. Coleman, and advised of my Constitutional rights.

2. I have read the transcripts of both of the above-mentioned examinations, and I hereby affirm that my testimony therein is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.


E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

Sworn to before me this sixth
day of February, 1976.


John C. Henry
Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan. 4, 1977

ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate

R2146

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DN 5/23/77
BY [signature]

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Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED:
DN 3/3/77
BY [signature]

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

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(1)(A)
(1)(B)

Saturday, January 10, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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1 might have directed me to this particular unit.

2 I was told that somewhere within the overall political
3 and psychological staff there was located a man with a small
4 office. This man's name was Pash, Colonel Boris Pash, and
5 my understanding was that Colonel Pash had been doing business,
6 let us say, with the Agency in West Germany for quite a while.

7 I sought out Colonel Pash. I was directed to his office
8 and found sitting with him another Agency officer named [redacted]

9 [redacted] I'm not sure whether it is [redacted]

10 Mr. Baron. It's a Greek name. [redacted] is his correct
11 first name, but he goes by [redacted]

12 Mr. Hunt. Very good. But in any case, he was known
13 throughout my career as [redacted] And I was at that
14 point on, let's say, a search mission to determine whether the
15 alleged capability of Colonel Pash in "wet affairs," which is
16 how it was referred to, that is liquidations, would have any
17 relevance to our particular problem of the Albanian dis-
18 appointments.

19 Mr. Baron. By liquidations, you mean assassinations?

20 Mr. Hunt. Assassinations. Assassinations, kidnappings,
21 removals, let's say.

22 This had been alleged to me. So I spoke to Colonel Pash
23 in Mr. [redacted] presence. I explained the problem to him,
24 although at that juncture I'm quite sure that we had not
25 identified the Albanian suspect. So we were talking hypothetically

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1 earlier, that when I first inquired around for the location of
2 Colonel Pash and his assistant, the reaction I encountered
3 was a rather jesting one, and the impression I gained was
4 here were a couple of men who were drawing salaries and doing
5 very little.

6 And so when Colonel Pash seemed reluctant to become
7 involved in responding affirmatively to my questions, my
8 inference was that Colonel Pash and [redacted] could well not
9 have such a capability but for purposes of employment and
10 status, this was the job they had. But they didn't want
11 anyone to call upon them to activate their particular
12 abilities.

13 Now that was my impression, and I was a little disgusted
14 by it. I think I talked to the Chief of the PP staff later,
15 who was of course well aware of the Albanian problem and I
16 said I didn't get any satisfaction from Pash, but it doesn't
17 really make any difference because we don't have the name
18 of the suspected individual.

19 Mr. Baron. Just to stop here for a second and clear up
20 some of these details, were you under the impression that what
21 you called wet affairs, assassinations, kidnappings, or other
22 removals from the scene of troublesome individuals was the
23 primary function of this unit that Pash and [redacted] were
24 running?

25 Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact the only. As far as I knew, they

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1 had no other function. If they had another function, I was
2 never made aware of what it was.

3 Do you know anything about Colonel Pash's background?

4 Mr. Baron. I know a bit, but if you think that there are
5 relevant details to put on the background, go ahead.

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, I had not thought of Colonel Pash for
7 years until I began reading a book called "Lawrence and Oppen-
8 heimer," and I saw quite a few references to Colonel Pash. I
9 had known previously that he had been associated during the
10 war with the Manhattan Project and that he had a security
11 background. And as I believe I touched on briefly before, it
12 was my impression that Pash had been active a couple of years
13 at least before I knew him in West Germany with the sort of
14 thing that we had been discussing so far today.

15 Mr. Baron. What kinds of stories had you heard about
16 Pash's previous activities?

17 Mr. Hunt. Kidnapping mostly.

18 Mr. Baron. And where were those?

19 Mr. Hunt. West Germany and West Berlin.

20 Mr. Baron. Do you know the names of any of the victims
21 of the kidnapping or any of the people involved other than
22 Pash and [redacted]

23 Mr. Hunt. I do not.

24 Mr. Baron. And are you aware from whatever source of
25 any assassination planning or attempts that Pash was involved

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1 in?

2 Mr. Hunt. I am not.

3 Mr. Baron. Does your answer include not only the period
4 of time before you talked with Colonel Pash but after you
5 talked with Colonel Pash?

6 Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

7 I might add that I was rather briefly at CIA headquarters
8 at that time and within a very short period of time after I
9 had had my interview with Colonel Pash, I was transferred to the
10 Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.11 Mr. Baron. Is that the reason why you did not follow up
12 on the problem with this particular suspected double agent
13 after not receiving satisfaction from Colonel Pash?

14 Mr. Hunt. That certainly could have been one reason.

15 On the other hand, I was chief of, I can see I'm really going
16 to have to get into a lot more here. This is going to be
17 dry and dull stuff for you.18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] *in the sense that*
19 [REDACTED]20 [REDACTED] *I had made a trip at one time* [REDACTED]21 [REDACTED] *for King Zog* [REDACTED]22 who was very upset about the disappearance and loss of all
23 of his partisans in the operations that the Agency was conducting.

24 [REDACTED] -- the the counter-

25 intelligence or espionage aspect, which is not my function, but

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1 [REDACTED] to worry about. And also, we were trying
2 to bring Zog [REDACTED] So I became interested as
3 a matter of King Zog's disaffection in what was happening to
4 his retainers. Why were they being parachuted to their
5 deaths in Albania? And that was my introduction to the whole
6 scene in West Germany, where the balance of his retainers were
7 [REDACTED] Well, not being held, but where they
8 were being housed and trained for Albanian operations.

9 Mr. Baron. Can you explain the term "retainer"?

10 Mr. Hunt. Well, I understood that when he finally got
11 out of Albania, that he brought with him what I can best
12 describe as retainers. That is bodyguards, members of his
13 personal staff, probably some relatives. I think he had
14 four or five sisters with him. But the able-bodied portion
15 of those loyalists who came out with him we had largely taken
16 over thanks to Zog, who, in effect, [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] And then he never saw them again. He naturally
18 became apprehensive.

19 So that was my interest in what was happening to the
20 Albanians that we parachuted in [REDACTED] I had no
21 functional counter-espionage interest in the affair. This
22 would have been handled and this was handled by the Chief
23 of Counter-espionage for the Division.

24 Mr. Baron. Who would that have been at the time?

25 Mr. Hunt. I can't remember at this point.

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1 Mr. Baron. But that would be the person primarily
2 responsible for taking care of this double agent problem?

5 Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

4 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of what happened with that
5 suspected double agent?

6 Mr. Hunt. I have no idea because, as I may have indicated
7 previously off the record, it became apparent some years later
8 that the unfortunate fate of our Albanian agents was linked
9 far more closely to the revelations of Kim Philby, the
10 Soviet agent who was in direct liaison with us in Washington
11 and in Great Britain, rather than any penetration, although
12 the possibility of a penetration was of course always there.
13 But I don't think that anybody was ever focused.

14 Again, I left for Latin American affairs. I left the
15 Division about that time and I really never heard about it
16 again. [redacted] the Albanian chief, departed for
17 Southeast Asia, and the whole sort of complex of knowledgeable
18 people was broken up through normal transfers and special
19 activities like the Guatemala project.

20 Mr. Baron. Was [redacted] knowledgeable about your
21 approach to Colonel Pash?

22 Mr. Hunt. Very likely he was, yes. I don't think I
23 would have discussed anything with Colonel Pash about the
24 matter without talking to [redacted] about it.

25 Mr. Baron. Who else would have known that you approached

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1 Colonel Pash with the idea in mind of seeing if an assassination
2 or a kidnapping couldn't be arranged?

3 Mr. Hunt. The then Chief of Foreign Intelligence and
4 Counter-Intelligence for the Division. And I think now that that
5 was ~~Charley English, Charles English~~. I think he wore both
6 hats. He had both foreign intelligence responsibility and
7 the counter-intelligence responsibility. And I might have told
8 the division chief about it, although it was not, it had not
9 achieved such stature at that point that I would have
10 necessarily talked to the Division Chief, who I believe at
11 that time was John Richardson of later Vietnam fame.

12 It's also possible that the Division Chief in that era
13 was John Baker, now deceased, who left that division to
14 become Chief of the PP staff, and that would have been a
15 normal follow through for me if I had discussed it with John
16 Baker, my direct Chief, and then to have discussed it with
17 him when he was my staff chief in the overall political and
18 psychological staff.

19 Mr. Baron. Anyone else who would have known about your
20 approach to Colonel Pash or about --

21 Mr. Hunt. Or his function.

22 Mr. Baron. Yes, that Colonel Pash was considered to have
23 assassinations as one of his functions.

24 Mr. Hunt. We had a Colonel Buffington who at that time
25 was a member of the PP staff, the overall PP staff, and I think

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1 that he would have been knowledgeable about it.
2

3 Mr. Baron. Was that Milton Buffington?

4 Mr. Hunt. Yes. I think he later went on and had a career
5 in the Office of Security. Milton Buffington, yes.

6 Mr. Baron. Anyone else?

7 Mr. Hunt. Yes, I have the names of three men who unfor-
8 tunately are dead. I could give those names, though. Mr. C.
9 Tracy Barnes, Mr. John Baker, who I've already mentioned, and Mr
10 [REDACTED] These men were all at one time or another
11 chiefs of the Agency's PP staff.

12 Another man now living to the best of my knowledge who
13 might well have had knowledge of Pash's function was the
14 then-chief of the Economic Warfare staff of the PP staff and his
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1 name was Gates Lloyd. He later became the Deputy Director for
2 Support of the Agency.

3 There's a man named [redacted] who was in the
4 Psychological Warfare Branch of the PP staff. I believe at
5 that time there was an International Organizations Branch
6 which later became the International Organizations Division,
7 then headed by Cord Myer, Jr., and his Deputy at that time was
8 Tom Braden, the now-columnist whose wife has just ascended to
9 the Executive Office Building. There were members of the
10 Labor Branch, and I'm trying to think of that branch of office
11 that was down the hall.

12 There was a labor branch. The people in there might know.
13 There was a lady lawyer named Carol somebody who was very
14 knowledgeable about what was going on in that area.

15 Mr. Baron. Knowledgeable about Pash's activities?

16 Mr. Hunt. Well, in the sense that when you have an
17 adjoining office, you usually pretty much know what the other
18 fellow is doing. Just in that sense, because her function
19 in the labor branch had nothing to do with Pash, to my
20 knowledge.

21 What I'm trying to do here is to give you sort of a
22 congeries of people alive and dead who would have had contact
23 knowledge, at the very least, of what Pash's function was.

24 Mr. Baron. Were each of these units referred to as
25 PB with a number following it?

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1 Operations and OPC, the staff structure emerged as follows:

2 Reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans, i.e. Frank
3 Wisner, whose Chief of Operations then was Richard Helms, this
4 is the Clandestine Services Organization. There was our
5 support staff, the PP staff, the Foreign Intelligence staff,
6 the Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Espionage staff, and of
7 course the famous staff "D".

8 Also reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans were all
9 of the geographical divisions, such as Western Europe, Southeast
10 Europe, Asia, Near East, and so forth.

11 Mr. Baron. Now at this point Frank Wisner was DDP,
12 Richard Helms was his deputy.

13 Mr. Hunt. Richard Helms was his Chief of Operations.

14 Mr. Baron. All right. The Chief of the PP staff was --

15 Mr. Hunt. Either Tracy Barnes or John Baker or [redacted]

16 [redacted]
17 Mr. Baron. And you were located on the South European --

18 Mr. Hunt. Southern Europe Division.

19 Mr. Baron. Who headed that division at that point?

20 Mr. Hunt. Either John Baker or John Richardson.

21 So as you see, I had a line responsibility to the Chief
22 of the Southeast Europe Division, as indicated in Exhibit 3.

23 At the same time I had a functional responsibility to the
24 Chief of the PP staff, who was Mr. Barnes or Mr. Baker or
25 [redacted] just as the Chief of PI for the Southeast Europe

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1 Mr. Hunt. Does this satisfy your request?

2 Mr. Baron. It does, indeed.

3 Of all of the individuals that you have just mentioned,
4 which ones do you know to your own certainty were clearly
5 knowledgeable of Boris Pash's activities?

6 Mr. Hunt. [redacted] would be the first one, and
7 after that I can only speculate. I would have to assume that
8 [redacted] acquired knowledge of it, but perhaps he acquired
9 knowledge through me. I'm not sure. I have made a list of
10 other people whom I have not mentioned who conceivably, by
11 virtue of personal contact or functional responsibility, might
12 well have been aware of Pash's true functional responsibility
13 within the Agency.

14 Mr. Baron. Before I ask you to tick off that list, let's
15 make it clear that all of the names, in addition to [redacted]

16 [redacted] are names that you have given as people who are
17 likely to have been knowledgeable of Pash's activities because
18 of their place in the organization structure at that time.

19 Mr. Hunt. That's correct, or as I have indicated in some
20 cases, as with the PP labor branch by virtue of physical
21 proximity to that office.

22 Mr. Baron. Okay. Why don't you now just run very briefly
23 through the names of other people who you think could conceivably
24 have been knowledgeable of Pash's function?

25 Mr. Hunt. In some cases I'm going to have to give you their

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1 title designation rather than the name of the individual because
2 so much time has passed, I have simply forgotten who it was
3 in that particular era.

4 [redacted] who at that time was a member of the German
5 branch of the Western Europe Division, he has since retired
6 and is running his family's [redacted] business in New York. Certainly
7 the then Chief of Western Europe Division, of which Germany
8 was a functional part and the Chief of Operations of Western
9 Europe should know.

10 I would think that Jim Angleton, who would have had
11 direct knowledge and always was the Chief of the CI/CE staff.
12 The Chief of base in [redacted] if in fact Pash conducted any
13 activities in that area, certainly the Chief of base in
14 [redacted] would have been knowledgeable about it.

15 Also, the Chief of base at [redacted] which was where we
16 had the [redacted] operation going on. I don't know whether
17 Bill Harvy, that is William Harvy, at that time was Chief of
18 Operations [redacted] Berlin or whether he was simply running the
19 tunnel, but Harvy might well have some knowledge of Pash.

20 I would certainly assume that when we're talking about
21 liquidations and that sort of thing that the Agency's overall
22 Office of Security somewhere within it must have been involved,
23 such German Division personnel as might be available today,
24 West German, and I would also suggest that General Cushman might
25 be knowledgeable for this reason.

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1 It was about that time that General Cushman was still
2 assigned to the CIA. I could be wrong about that but I seem
3 to have a memory of Cushman being around in those days. He
4 was then a Colonel. I had associated with him. In fact, we
5 had shared an office at one time, but that was several years
6 earlier. I would place it about early 1949. But I'm quite
7 sure that Cushman was around in that period of time and
8 involved with the PP staff, though what his function was I
9 don't know.

10 Now there are alive two close friends of mine who were
11 then members of the PP staff, [redacted] and [redacted]
12 These are men who in effect established the PP staff for
13 Frank Wisner and then left to go on to other things. They
14 are both well known writers.

15 Mr. Baron. Let me just return to one name that you
16 mentioned and that is William Harvey.

17 Did you -- first, generally, what was the nature of your
18 operational relationships to William Harvey after this period?

19 Did you have any?

20 Mr. Hunt. I never had any, no. In fact, I've only seen
21 him once in my life, to the best of my recollection.

22 Mr. Baron. As you may know, William Harvey was tasked
23 in 1961 with setting up an executive action capability at
24 the CIA, tasked originally by Richard Bissell to carry out
25 assassinations if required.

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1 because we're going to slop over into this other matter that
2 Mr. Liebengood wants to talk about tomorrow.

3 Mr. Baron. Well, why don't we hold off then, except
4 that for this one question, which is are you aware of any
5 involvement that Dr. Gunn had in assassination planning?

6 Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not because I'm just not familiar
7 with assassination planning. And specifically, for that
8 reason, I'm not aware of any involvement that Dr. Gunn might
9 have had.

10 Mr. Baron. Let's return now to the point of departure,
11 which was your conversation with Colonel Pash and the events
12 that led up to it.

13 Who were your supervisors that gave you the impression
14 that Colonel Pash was prepared to carry out assassinations?

15 Mr. Hunt. I wish I could give you a distinct name. I
16 think I covered that in an impressionistic way by saying that
17 Tracy Barnes and John Baker, who were at different times
18 sequentially chiefs of the PP staff, it seems to me that Barnes
19 was probably the one who indicated that Pash had such a
20 capability.

21 I know that I did not get it from [redacted] and I'm
22 quite sure that my information did not come from within the
23 Southeast Europe Division. It must have come accordingly
24 from the Political and Psychological staff, the contacts there,
25 and I would have to say Tracy Barnes or John Baker are the

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1 most likely.

2 Mr. Baron. And neither of those two men are alive today?

3 Mr. Hunt. That's right.

4 Mr. Baron. Did whoever gave you the information about
5 Boris Pash indicate to you that there were any other units
6 in the CIA that could take care of such problems by means of
7 assassination?

8 Mr. Hunt. No. My distinct impression and recollection is
9 the function, if indeed it existed, and I believed it then
10 to have existed as I do today, was centralized or focused in
11 Colonel Pash and [redacted]

12 Mr. Baron. Now what would have been the formal title
13 of the unit that Colonel Pash and [redacted] were running?

14 Mr. Hunt. If it had one, I never knew it.

15 Mr. Baron. Can you add any other detail to the record
16 on your talk with Colonel Pash and his reaction to your
17 request that he consider on a general level the planning of
18 an assassination of a suspected double agent?

19 Mr. Hunt. Well, as I recall it, my conversation with him
20 was a relatively brief one. I stepped in the door, met him,
21 saw [redacted], who I knew briefly, or at least knew him
22 by sight, and I sat down and I said, we have this problem in
23 the Albanian branch. We may need somebody liquidated in
24 Western Germany. Can you handle it if that day comes, or if
25 it comes to that?

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1 And he seemed a little startled. I have already indicated
2 that. What I'm trying to do now is to refine my thoughts more
3 than I did previously when we were taking sort of a wide
4 swipe at the canvas.

5 Colonel Pash indicated or said to me that it was a matter
6 that would have to be approved by higher authority and as
7 a relatively low ranking officer in those days, I thought he
8 was probably referring to Frank Wisner. And indeed, he may
9 have. It never got pushed up to Frank Wisner's level because
10 there no direct approach or a request for such approval
11 was ever made.

12 I left with the impression that Colonel Pash was glad
13 that he wasn't going to have any business for me or that he
14 had successfully deflected whatever approach I might be making
15 to him because it would give him and [redacted] an
16 opportunity to drink more coffee and to draw their salaries
17 from the Agency while affecting to do a job that they were
18 perhaps not equipped to do.

19 Now again, that impression I had when I left him was at
20 variance with what I had heard before I came in, where I heard
21 he and [redacted] or he at least had been active in West Germany
22 in wet affairs, particularly kidnappings and that sort of
23 thing.

24 Mr. Baron. And you carried into his office the impression
25 that Colonel Pash was a man who could carry off an assassination

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1 Mr. Hunt. No.

2 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone
3 other than Colonel Pash?

4 Mr. Hunt. In that context?

5 Mr. Baron. In the context of assassinations or kidnapping.

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, I wasn't involved in plotting or planning
7 any kidnappings. Again, I would suggest that I might very
8 well have gone back to [redacted] who was the most interested
9 individual, because he was responsible at the branch level

10 [redacted] as an operational tool, whereas, I had an overall
11 political responsibility [redacted] And I have described
12 the background of that, the rubric under which I became
13 interested in the Albanian problem in the first place, and
14 then having talked to Pash, it would have been only natural
15 for me to have said to [redacted] look, I've talked with Pash
16 and he says it will have to be approved by higher authority.
17 Now have you gotten, we don't have a body yet, but when you
18 get a name to put on the target, at that point you will have to
19 carry the ball and take it on up the line.

20 Mr. Baron. And you never heard anything further about it?

21 Mr. Hunt. No, probably because I went within, I think,
22 a comparatively few weeks off to the Guatemala operation.

23 Mr. Baron. Did anyone ever mention it to you, say did
24 [redacted] ever mention it to you again?

25 Mr. Hunt. No. I next saw [redacted] in [redacted] in [redacted]

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1 it would be about '57 or '58, and I had dinner in his home in
2 Taipei, and I'm quite sure I said at that time, whatever
3 happened to Boris Pash, or what do you hear from Boris?

4 Now he was a rather unusual individual to say the least,
5 and I don't think [redacted] told me that he was dead. I don't
6 know who told me that Boris, that Pash died, but whatever
7 he said, it was, well, he was okay the last time I saw him
8 and that was the last time we ever discussed it.

9 Mr. Baron. And you didn't discuss this request?

10 Mr. Hunt. No.

11 Mr. Baron. Where did you receive the impression that
12 Colonel Pash was dead?

13 Mr. Hunt. I guess when, either from reading the Lawrence
14 and Oppenheimer book or from the newspapers, from the Crewdson
15 story. I don't think at the first level when I began recalling
16 the story, I don't think I was aware that Boris Pash was
17 dead.

18 Mr. Baron. In the Crewdson story there is an allusion
19 to the fact that Colonel Pash is probably dead.

20 Are you saying that that came from Crewdson's research
21 and not from yourself?

22 Mr. Hunt. Oh, yes, that came from Crewdson's research, not
mine.

23 Mr. Baron. This is more than a minor note on the record,
24 Colonel Bash is not dead.

25 Mr. Hunt. Oh, good, I thought he was dead.

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1 my assumption at that time was that authorization by Frank
2 Wisner would have been all that would have been required to
3 proceed with the project had it ever materialized. That is
4 the Chief of the Clandestine Services.

5 Now whether Frank would have been required to go to
6 Allen Dulles, I rather doubt it. I think it is something that
7 he would have been able to authorize himself.

8 Mr. Baron. All right. Let me ask you now before we get
9 into Colonel Pash's version of the story, which we will,
10 whether it is possible that you are confusing the time periods
11 here?

12 So as not to hold anything back from you, Colonel Pash
13 has said that the time period has to be off because he
14 retired from the Agency, or left the Agency in probably late
15 '51. It's possible that it went into 1952. But he wasn't
16 with the Agency in any capacity after '52. And in fact, his
17 status was that of a military officer who had been detailed
18 to the Agency from approximately 1948 to '52.

19 Now does that affect your recollection in any way of the
20 period '54 to '55 as the period when your conversation with
21 Boris Pash took place?

22 Mr. Hunt. Well, from 1950 to 1953, I was in Mexico [redacted]

23 [redacted]
24 Mr. Baron. And where were you from the time that you
25 joined the Agency until you went to Mexico?

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1 Mr. Hunt. I was a member of the PP staff.

2 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that your conversation with
3 Boris Pash about the assassination of a suspected double agent
4 took place in that time period?

5 Mr. Hunt. I would have to say it's possible, yes.

6 Mr. Baron. Would you have been dealing with East
7 European problems or --

8 Mr. Hunt. No, I was dealing with West European problems.

9 Mr. Baron. I'm sorry. Would you have been dealing with
10 a problem like this one, a problem with a suspected Albanian
11 double agent in West Germany during that time period?

12 Mr. Hunt. I can't recall having done so. The West
13 European Division had its own PP staff officer and he would
14 have been the one to take it up, whereas my recollection is
15 that this was generated at a later time when I was in the
16 Southeast European Division and had a direct reason to become
17 interested in the matter.

18 I have to say that it is possible, but I would say maybe
19 5 percent possible.

20 Mr. Baron. And you accord so small a possibility to
21 the hypothesis that you actually talked to Pash about this
22 problem in '49 or '50 because you were not involved in
23 operations in West Germany at that point.

24 Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

25 Mr. Baron. And [redacted] at that

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1 point?

2 Mr. Hunt. No, no. He was not.

3 Mr. Baron. Where were you in '49 and '50 physically?

4 Mr. Hunt. Physically I was in the JRK building with the
5 PP staff and my direct supervisor at that time was [redacted]
6 who I have mentioned earlier.7 Mr. Baron. Did you travel to West Germany during that
8 period of time?

9 Mr. Hunt. No, I did not.

10 Mr. Baron. In the later period, '50, '54, and '55, that
11 you were discussing, did you travel often to West Germany?

12 Mr. Hunt. No.

13 Mr. Baron. You were stationed in Washington?

14 Mr. Hunt. I was stationed in Washington and from the
15 period after I left Mexico, which was in, I think, March of '54
16 for about the ensuing year when I left for the Guatemala project,
17 I was in Washington or the SE Europe Division. So I had
18 that continuous almost year there.19 Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that adds to your
20 sense of the probabilities that this conversation took place
21 in '54 and '55?22 Mr. Hunt. No. My restructuring is as I have given it
23 to you, my recollections.24 Mr. Baron. Okay. Let me ask you the same question in
25 maybe a straightforward manner.**TOP SECRET**

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1 political affairs, and his was the 7th, which had less well
2 defined functions. And [redacted] was a member of that unit.

3 Do you recall any dealings that you had in your earliest
4 period of service with the CIA with PB7, now that I've refreshed
5 your recollection?

6 Mr. Hunt. Not as such, no. Does Colonel Pash define
7 what his functions were in the PB7?

8 Mr. Baron. Before I answer that one, let me ask you one.

9 Mr. Hunt. I've been trying to develop a helpful colloquy
10 here.

11 Mr. Baron. This is very helpful.

12 Do you recall any charters that any of those planning
13 branches had?

14 Mr. Hunt. At this juncture, no. I was only aware that,
15 I think mine was PB2. This is when I first went in in 1949
16 or 1950. I think that was [redacted] outfit.

17 Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash described the charter of PB7
18 as giving PB7 responsibility for such other functions as the
19 six other units didn't perform.

20 Does that square with your recollection of what he was
21 doing in those early days?

22 Mr. Hunt. Well, you see, I don't associate Colonel Pash
23 with the very early days. I associate him with a later period,
24 about three years or five years later.

25 Mr. Baron. Do you have any specific recollection of Colone

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1 Pash's activities in the years 1949 to 1952?

2 Mr. Hunt. Not at all, no. My only other collateral
3 recollection is that Colonel Pash was said to have come to us.
4 He was recently assigned in Germany and he had come to us
5 from there. That was all that I knew.

6 Mr. Baron. [redacted] who has also testified this
7 past week on this subject, said that his recollection of the
8 charter of PB7 was that it gave PB7 responsibility for
9 assassinations, kidnappings and such other functions as higher
10 authority may assign or as were not being performed by other
11 units.

12 Does that square with the impression that you were given
13 by your superiors of the functions of Colonel Pash's unit?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes. I didn't even know that [redacted] was
15 still alive. So [redacted] then supports my functional recollection,
16 let's say.

17 Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit 6 an article in
18 the New York Times dated January 8th, 1976, headed "Retired
19 Colonel Denies Heading CIA Unit for Assassinations."

20 (The document referred to was
21 marked for identification as
22 Hunt Exhibit No. 6)

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1 with real certainty that no such conversation took place and
2 that even in terms of exploring the possibility of assassination
3 planning or inquiring into the capability for assassination
4 planning, he maintains that assassinations were never raised
5 with him, what do you then have to say about his
6 testimony?

7 Mr. Hunt. I would have to say that his perceptions and
8 mine were at variance and that we were engaged in some sort
9 of an Aesopian dialogue in which neither of us understood
10 what the other was saying.

11 I had no other reason to approach him. I had never heard
12 of the man except in that particular context.

13 Mr Baron. And there was no other reason for them
14 discussing capabilities for an assassination?

15 Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

16 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any specific function that
17 Colonel Pash performed with the CIA after the date of 1952?

18 Mr. Hunt. Well, my recollection is that I saw him in
19 '54 and '55 and that's the only specific function that I can
20 relate him to.

21 Mr. Baron. Now you have drawn a chart of the PP staff,
22 Exhibit 4, that locates Colonel Pash and [redacted] on the
23 PP staff.

24 Is it possible that they served on the PP staff before the
25 date the Colonel Pash gives as his retirement date from the

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1 CIA, which is sometime in '52?

2 Mr. Hunt. Is it possible? Yes, I believe it's possible
3 because [redacted] was one of the original people in OPC.

4 Mr. Baron. At what point did OPC merge or was it
5 transformed?

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, it merged with OSO, I think, in 1953
7 when I was [redacted] [redacted] in Mexico and I became [redacted]
8 [the] [redacted] in Mexico in '53, and
9 I came out of there in, I think, March of '54, I left Mexico.

10 By that time the merger had taken place.

11 Mr. Baron. So is it possible that this chart could have
12 been a chart of the PP staff as it operated under the OPC
13 structure, the 453?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact, I don't think that there was
15 any particular change from the PB to the PP era.

16 Mr. Baron. The reason for my own confusion here is that
17 Colonel Pash and [redacted] have both said that at the
18 point when OPC was merged, or at some point shortly thereafter,
19 PB7 was abolished and they don't know what became of it.
20 They say the functions that these seven planning branches
21 performed were scrambled and reorganized and they were never
22 sure exactly who carried through the functions that had
23 previously been assigned to PB7.

24 Mr. Hunt. Well, I never heard any more about it.

25 Just for perhaps a bit more clarification, the labor

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1 unit or branch as it appeared in the PP staff following the
2 merger, that had the same function and the same personnel as
3 let's say whatever PB enumerated or numerical designations.
4 So it's just a question of terminology. I can see that for
5 chronological purposes you are interested in how I recall it,
6 whether I recall it by a PB numerical designation or by --
7 But since I never knew what the Pash-[redacted] unit was designated,
8 whether it was designated by a word or by a number, it
9 doesn't help me at all. And for that reason I can't be
10 of more assistance to you.

11 Just go see Colonel Pash. He's in such and such an office
12 down there.

13 Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

14 (Discussion off the record)

15 Mr. Baron. For the record now, while we were off the
16 record we agreed to continue this session a while to get into
17 one or two other areas. But I have a couple of questions to
18 tag on to the end of this one.

19 First of all, [redacted] in his testimony to the
20 Committee, said that he had no recollection of a conversation
21 with you where he was present, and you discussed assassination
22 of a double agent, or the planning for such a mission with
23 Colonel Pash and himself.

24 Do you, even having heard his testimony, still have a
25 clear recollection that [redacted] was present when you

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1 had this conversation?

2 Mr. Hunt. I do, because to the best of my knowledge and
3 belief, it was the first time that I had met [redacted].

4 That is, I had seen him in the corridors, but it was the
5 first time that I was able to append a name to the particular
6 individual who I had come to recognize visually.

7 My memory is further jogged in this respect, that [redacted]
8 having identified me as a member of the SE division of the
9 staff, at a later time but not much later, talked to me about
10 the possibility of his being assigned to the SE division.

11 And my recollection of the conversation is that [redacted] told
12 me that he was a great friend of [redacted]
13 and that this friendship should be put to use for the Agency's
14 benefit, and it could be best done by his being transferred
15 to SE division for ultimate assignment to Athens.

16 Mr. Baron. Do you have from anything in your experience
17 in the CIA any personal animosity toward Colonel Pash or
18 [redacted]

19 Mr. Hunt. On the contrary. I've always regarded myself
20 as a friend of [redacted], and I only had one contact
21 with Boris Pash. And I have no feeling about him one way
22 or the other except that in his recent book I read about his
23 involvement in the Manhattan Project and I certainly admired
24 his contribution to national security in that era.

End 2A, b. 2B

25 Mr. Baron. In [redacted] testimony, he gave us an

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1 account of an incident when he was stationed at [redacted] and he said
2 that he had written a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a propaganda
3 program because he was involved in propaganda operations at
4 that point. And he said, unbeknownst to him, someone else
5 in his station with the approval of the Chief of Station
6 attached an extra paragraph to this cable which suggested the
7 assassination of Chou En Lai in preparation for the Bandoeng
8 Conference where Chou En Lai was supposed to be an important
9 spokesman on behalf of many Asian nations.

10 And the way that [redacted] recounted the incident,
11 he knew nothing about the paragraph that had been attached to
12 his cable until the reply came back very strongly in the
13 negative and eventually, a high ranking CIA official came out
14 to [redacted] to reprimand everyone involved in the incident for
15 suggesting assassination.

16 Do you have any recollection of that incident?

17 Mr. Hunt. No, I have no knowledge. What year does

18 [redacted] prefer to because I was in [redacted]
19 [redacted] in Tokyo from, oh, about '55 to
20 '56 or '57. And I would have seen most of the traffic that
21 came out of [redacted] in that period of time. But I don't know
22 if -- I know that [redacted] stayed on in [redacted] much after my
23 time in the Far East.

24 I don't know when the Bandoeng Conference took place. I
25 remember it, of course, but I don't remember the year.

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1 Mr. Baron. It appears to me that the Bandoeng Conference
2 took place, according to [redacted] testimony, in 1955
3 and that the incident he was describing was either in '55 or
4 late in '54.

5 Mr. Hunt. I had no recollection of it whatever. [redacted]
6 is not suggesting that is some basis for personal animosity,
7 I trust.

8 Mr. Baron. No. He did say, though, that you might have
9 had knowledge of that suggestion, although he wasn't sure of
10 it. He said you were involved at that time in a place where
11 you might have seen cable traffic like that.

12 Mr. Hunt. That's quite right, but I never saw that
13 traffic.

14 Mr. Baron. Let me pick up one last general question for
15 the moment at least on assassinations.

16 Do you have any knowledge of even the consideration of
17 assassinations at high levels of the American government?

18 In other words, we have been using the term higher
19 authority and I would like to use it for the moment now to
20 refer to the level of the DCI or the National Security Council,
21 the President, his close White House advisors, Cabinet
22 officials, and the DCI.

23 Do you have any knowledge of any people at that level
24 seriously considering assassination planning?

25 Mr. Hunt. No, none. I think you have to bear in mind

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1 to me and I was surprised when on invasion day Castro was
2 alive. I now realize from testimony that Harvey and others
3 have given that the matter had been discussed long before my
4 arrival on the scene and it was in hand one way or the other.

5 Mr. Baron. When was your arrival on the scene?

6 Mr. Hunt. Spring of 1960. I transferred up, I actually
7 made my trip to Havana the summer of 1960, and then we had
8 the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April of '61.

9 Mr. Baron. Now it is my own recollection of our
10 assassination report that no action was taken to carry out
11 an assassination plan against Castro as early as the spring
12 of 1960.

13 Did something --

14 Mr. Hunt. No. I've giving you, I guess, a bureaucratic
15 answer. I was officially transferred back to Washington in
16 the spring of 1960 and I took some leave en route in Spain

17 [redacted]
18 [redacted]
19 Eventually I made my way back to Washington in the spring
20 and early summer and got on the scene within a few days of
21 my actually reporting into the project managers, i.e., Bissell
22 and Barnes, who decided I would go down to Havana for a period
23 of time, and I went down for about a week and came back, and
24 by that time we were talking maybe July or so.

25 Mr. Baron. July of '60?

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Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

2 Mr. Baron. Before we move away from Cuban operations,
3 let me show you one cable that we have which is from [redacted] Madrid
4 and it appears to be to CIA headquarters because it is marked
5 IN 75100, and it is dated September 16, 1964 in handwriting
6 that was put on the copy that we have by the Agency.

7 This is not the original copy of the cable but it appears
8 to be a copy that was deleted and paraphrased for the purposes
9 of providing it to the Committee in the early days of our
10 inquiry.

We will mark this as Exhibit 7.

(The document referred to was
marked for identification as
Hunt Exhibit No. 7)

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1 Mr. Hunt. That can't conceivably have been a reference to
2 me.

3 Mr. Baron. Why is that?

4 Mr. Hunt. Because I had not been involved in Cuban
5 activities for more than three years at that time. I was
6 purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay
7 of Pigs.

8 Mr. Baron. You said you did operate out of Madrid for a
9 period of time but it was later than September of '64?

10 Mr. Hunt. No. Let me clarify that.

11 I was sent to Madrid in either '64 or '65. I can't
12 recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. [I was on
13 [REDACTED] My

14 communications were handled independently between myself and
15 Tom Karamessines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans.

16 This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms.
17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.

19 Mr. Baron. And did you have any knowledge of a relationship,
20 to a plan to assassinate Castro, supposedly to take place
21 during a university ceremony?

22 Mr. Hunt. No.

23 Mr. Baron. Let's move on now to an entirely different
24 area, and I will ask you to begin by describing your general
25 role in the middle of the 1960s on the CA staff with regard to

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1 press publications or press placements or any responsibilities
2 you may have had for media relations.

3 Mr. Hunt. After Allen Dulles's resignation and retirement,
4 I was assigned for about a period of a week to the CA staff
5 and I then transferred to the newly set up Domestic Operations
6 Division under Tracy Barnes, which was really the Commercial
7 Operations Division, although it was never so-called.

8 I was the first Chief of Covert Action for the Domestic
9 Operations Division and we inherited as a new division a number
10 of projects that had been running for a period of time, that
11 had been run by the commercial staff of the Agency and by a
12 number of the geographic divisions.

13 The purpose of turning these ongoing projects over to the
14 Domestic Operations Division was to centralize contacts with
15 publishers in the United States for the benefit of geographic
16 divisions such as the Asian or Far East Division which might
17 want a book published on [redacted] for a particular purpose.
18 They would come to Tracy Barnes with a particular request.

19 And I should say that the relationship with the Frederick
20 A. Praeger Publishing Company had been in existence for quite
21 a period of time and I think they were managed by Cord Myer
22 International Division, if I'm not mistaken, or possibly the
23 CA staff. But what we received were ongoing operations. We
24 were sent the case files for the Frederick A. Praeger project,
25 for the Fodor Guides project, for the Continental Press

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1 organization, which had been operating out of the National
2 ~~Press~~ Building in Washington. We had a project in [redacted] which
3 I visited on one occasion called [redacted] which we ran
4 out of a [redacted] Virginia office.

5 I had no personal media contacts with American magazines
6 or newspapers, if that is the thrust of your question.

7 Mr. Baron. Actually, I'm interested in this whole area,
8 both contacts with specific reporters or media people dome-
9 stically or contacts with publishing houses or contacts abroad
10 in the publishing field.

11 Mr. Hunt. Well, I've given you the names of the publishing
12 houses that we had contact with. I did on one occasion meet
13 and I can't recall the purpose of it, it was a very large
14 textbook publishing house and their main offices were in
15 New Jersey. If I had an annual for publishers, I could pull
16 it out.

17 But beside from that publishing house, we never did any
18 business with them. I don't recall of any publishing houses
19 beyond ~~Frederick A. Praeger~~, that is trade publishers, that
20 we dealt with.

21 We had our own press agency, ~~Continental Press~~, which I
22 imagine you're quite familiar with.

23 Mr. Hunt. Can you describe the standard mode of
24 operating with these various publishing outlets?

25 In other words, how would you have supplied them with

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1 material? Would you urge them to publish a manuscript they
2 already had from another source? Would you give them a
3 manuscript that CIA personnel had written under a pseudonym?

4 Mr. Hunt. I don't think that ever took place, to my
5 knowledge.

6 What I recall is [redacted] meeting with Tracy Barnes
7 and me or individually, either in Washington or New York during
8 this period and saying I have a great book I would love to
9 publish, but it's not economically feasible, and I think it
10 would be good for you people abroad for the following reasons.

11 And we might come up with the differential or we might not.

12 I don't recall any Agency-created manuscripts that were
13 sent to [redacted] or for that matter, any other publisher.

14 I recall we had a lot of accounting problems with [redacted]
15 and finally we got really almost bogged down in arguments
16 about back copies. It was a little on the nightmarish side.
17 We did turn out some good books, but I couldn't give you a
18 title at this point. But I'm sure that they are a matter of
19 record within the Agency.

20 Mr. Baron. What was the nightmarish aspect of it?

21 Mr. Hunt. Well, apparently, before the project came under
22 DOD, it had been handled on a very freewheeling basis by the
23 previous project managers. [redacted] got everything he wanted
24 from the Agency in terms of subsidy money and expense money
25 and publicity money and that sort of thing and when we took

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1 it over it was brought under -- I hesitate to use the term
2 professional management, but I do so in a qualified sense in
3 that I was the only one, I guess, who knew anything about the
4 publishing industry, who had ever been connected with the
5 project. So I knew a little about it.

6 And at that time, with the help of our own commercial
7 people within the Division, our accountants and auditors and
8 so forth determined that there were a number of aspects of
9 our fiduciary relationship with the Praeger company that would
10 bear greater investigation.

11 So the relationship from a freewheeling one prior to our
12 DOD managerial take-over, it became from a freewheeling thing,
13 it became sort of an unpleasant continuous argument about
14 dollars and cents, rather than functional matters.

15 Mr. Baron. Out of what funds at the CIA did these monies
16 come from that we were giving to Praeger?

17 Mr. Hunt. I wouldn't have any idea, project money.

18 Mr. Baron. Who signed off on the project money?

19 Mr. Hunt. Well, it would depend on how much it cost.
20 I think that Karamessines could sign off up to \$50,000 and
21 beyond that it had to be signed off on by Helms, I think. That's
22 my best recollection. And I don't know -- as annual review
23 was conducted, and of course the division chief had to approve
24 it.

25 Mr. Baron. Did the operation involve companies other than

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1 the ones you've mentioned? In other words, supplying funds
2 to companies other than the ones you've already mentioned?

3 Mr. Hunt. I don't know of any. None that I knew of.

4 I would be very surprised if a memorandum showed up saying
5 that we were dealing with Random House, for example. I just
6 don't recall now.

7 Mr. Baron. Was there any other aspect to your liaison
8 with these publishing houses other than their seeking funds
9 to publish books that you were interested in having published?

10 Mr. Hunt. Only this, that the USIA was, I think, finally
11 brought into a formal relationship with DOD, at least my
12 part of it, and the head of the book division at USIA and I
13 would meet from time to time and he would indicate that he had
14 a good one that we really ought to do rather than USIA and
15 vice versa. And he knew fully of the Praeger relationship.

16 Mr. Baron. Can you describe the process that you would
17 go through to ensure the publication of a book that the CIA
18 was interested in having published? An example that I was
19 given by somebody on our staff who has been looking into this
20 was books written by or ghosted for Chinese [redacted]

21 Mr. Hunt. As I recall it, the Chinese branch sort of
22 ran a parallel operation. I don't recall their coming
23 through us. I don't recall a [redacted] book when I was in
24 that particular job. What I do recall is, I remember the
25 Near East Branch bringing to our attention a book that they

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1 would like to have [Praeger] publish, and it had to do with the
2 [redacted] dispute, the name of which I can't --
3 recall. So the manuscript would have been read by [Praeger]
4 or his principal assistant, and he would give an indication
5 of what he thought the marketability was. And at that point --
6 well, in this instance, we got the funds from the Near East
7 Division. When it came down to that, why should DOD, who had
8 no interest in the [redacted] dispute, provide money for
9 that particular piece of propaganda. So the money would be
10 transferred somehow from the Near East Division's allocation.
11 It would be their project, but we would be the managers of it
12 when it got down to the point of dealing face to face with
13 [Praeger] on the matter. My office would keep the division
14 apprised of the project, when publication could be expected,
15 and so forth.

16 Mr. Baron. Were there any other CIA publishing proprietaries
17 than the two you have mentioned, [redacted] and Continental?

18 Mr. Hunt. That I had personal knowledge of within the
19 Domestic Operations Division, no.

20 Mr. Baron. You qualified that by saying within the
21 Domestic Operations Division. Were there others?

22 Mr. Hunt. Because the international operations or Inter-
23 national Organizational Division under Cord Myer, ran quite a few
24 things in conjunction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom,
25 for example. Radio Free Europe, those things that went on.

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1 Mr. Baron. Did CIA do ghostwriting for non-CIA publi-
2 cations?

3 Mr. Hunt. I ghosted a couple of -- I'm very reluctant
4 to go into this, although I have discussed it with John
5 Crowdson. But this is another one of those difficult areas
6 where it's very hard for me to prove.

7 There came a time in the spring of, I think it was the
8 spring of about 1969, when the Soviet Russia Division asked
9 me if I could cause to have published something on the --
10 by this time I was no longer with the Domestic Operation
11 Division. I was with Western Europe -- on the increasing use
12 by the KGB of such covers as Aeroflot and things like that,
13 and Christ, I hope this doesn't get out.

14 And so I went to Helms. Howard Osborne was then Chief
15 of the Division, as I recall. He was late Director of
16 Security, and this had been staffed out. And I prepared the
17 article and it appeared in large portions unchanged under the
18 byline of [redacted]. And it was not a fabricated article.
19 It was just information which was supplied which he wrote
20 somewhat in his own style, and there was a second article which
21 appeared a month or two months later, and this was done by
22 Dick Helms.

23 Mr. Baron. Also under [redacted] byline?

24 Mr. Hunt. Yes. You could understand the difficulties
25 involved here and I don't need any more enemies. I have plenty.

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1 Now that is my own personal contribution to that sort of
2 thing. But I can't think of anything else that was done.

3 Mr. Baron. By other people? Was it a general practice
4 to supply either prefabricated articles or the material for
5 articles to favorable press contacts in this country?

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, we know about the [redacted] book,
7 [redacted] which was largely a cooperative venture with the Agency,
8 and that was done by the SR Division.

9 You are aware of that, aren't you?

10 Now in that case, you see, the SR reached out on its own.
11 Penkoski Papers was another example. We had nothing to do
12 with that in DOD. That was done, again, by SR division. And
13 I can understand why.

14 But basically, in answer to your question, I have given
15 you everything that I have personal knowledge of.

16 Mr. Baron. When you made the arrangement with [redacted]

18 Mr. Hunt. I made no arrangement with him.

19 Mr. Baron. Who handled liaison with him?

20 Mr. Hunt. Dick Helms.

21 Mr. Baron. And was that a one-on-one arrangement or
22 were there other people knowledgeable?

23 Mr. Hunt. I believe it was a one-on-one, old school tie
24 arrangement.

25 Mr. Baron. Was there any list kept at the CIA of favorable

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1 Frederick A. Praeger organization. I felt that a strict
2 construction of the CIA charter made the project quite suspect
3 because if we were doing a book, for example, on [redacted]
4 Communism, who was the target? It would have been highly
5 inappropriate for United States citizens to be the target
6 of the particular book, and we did a hell of a good book on
7 [redacted] Communism. It became about this thick. I can't
recall the title.

End Tape 2B8

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1 If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They
2 don't all necessarily read English, and we had a [redacted]

3 [redacted]
4 So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is
5 published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca,
6 then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this
7 was rationalized by the project review board that looked over
8 the Praeger operation, and the Fodor thing, and Continental
9 Press and things like that was that the ultimate target was
10 formed, which was true, but how much of the Praeger output
11 actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.

12 Now, in the case of Continental Press, the material was
13 physically mailed from Washington to foreign targets, the
14 [redacted] newspapers, I think particularly the [redacted]
15 Agency was a client. The mere fact that the project was
16 rooted in the United States gave it sort of a credibility
17 lustre abroad in that particular era. If it came out of
18 Washington then it was probably okay.

19 But I - [redacted] Continental Press had no domestic U.S. papers
20 as clients. What I'm trying to get at is that DOD handled
21 operations which were based domestically in the United States,
22 the commercial operations, and this includes proprietary
23 airlines and things like that, whose ultimate target was
24 abroad. The principal target or even a tangential target was
25 not the United States citizen.

TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Baron. But, with anything that was published in
2 English, the United States citizenry would become a likely
3 audience for the publication?

4 Mr. Hunt. A likely audience, definitely.

5 Mr. Baron. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure
6 that things that were published in English were kept out of
7 or away from the American reading public?

8 Mr. Hunt. It was impossible because Praeger was a
9 commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to
10 be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. Again I
11 say it was a matter of great difficulty. Mr. Barnes resolved
12 all that philosophically, and I simply carried out the dicta.

13 Mr. Baron. What was your philosophical opinion of the
14 danger of propagandizing Americans?

15 Mr. Hunt. Well, I knew that it was not a part of the
16 Agency charter, and it was a matter that the USIA looked at.
17 I talked about it occasionally. The USIA coincidentally had
18 come under some criticism at that time for subsidizing certain
19 publishers in the United States. That became known; I don't
20 recall how. I discussed with the USIA book man and with
21 Barnes the danger that we might be criticized for the same
22 reasons. I was never enchanted with the Praeger operation. I
23 thought it cost far too much money and had minimal benefits
24 abroad, and further, we had the liability, the vulnerability
25 to quite reasonable criticism that we had U.S. citizens as a

TOP SECRET

1 target, or an audience, I should say.

2 Mr. Baron. Were there any precautions taken against
 3 dissemination in America of publications by CIA proprietaries
 4 in English?

5 Mr. Hunt. Proprietaries, well, my only personal knowledge
 6 is the [Continental Press] operation which I say was simply mailed
 7 out of Washington. That was the only precaution, rather than
 8 our people mailing them themselves.

9 Mr. Baron. Were any techniques used to prevent contamina-
 10 tion of American intelligence by picking up on things that the
 11 CIA was actually publishing or arranging to have published?

12 Mr. Hunt. I would assume so, and I would guess that that
 13 would be done in the first instance by the knowledgeability of
 14 the reports officers in the various geographic divisions at
 15 headquarters who would scan newspapers, for example, or they
 16 would receive raw reports from [] let's say, and see that
 17 there had been a big sale of a particular book which we had
 18 sponsored, which they knew we had sponsored but nobody else
 19 knew. Of course, [] would have known about
 20 it, too.

21 So I would say that it was a pretty good fail-safe. The
 22 area of knowledgeability was high. For one thing, I traveled
 23 some in those days. I traveled to Bombay. I talked to the
 24 [] there. I traveled to New Delhi and talked to
 25 [] there, who was my CA opposite number, and

TOP SECRET

1 keep them up to date as to what we were planning. I would do
2 the same in France and so forth.

3 Mr. Baron. Were there any specific instances that you know
4 of of an eventual placement in the U.S. press of a story that
5 the CIA generated or fabricated abroad somewhere? For instance,
6 a story could conceivably be picked up by the UPI or by Reuters
7 that the CIA had planted abroad.

8 Mr. Hunt. I can't recall anything significant. I would
9 guess that during the Cuban, during the days of maximum
10 Cuban operation that sort of thing happened. I would think it
11 would be unavoidable, but I can't specify.

12 Mr. Baron. And are there any other instances than things
13 you have mentioned of direct placements of stories in the U.S.
14 press by the CIA?

15 Mr. Hunt. I have mentioned the [redacted] which was a
16 cooperative venture with [redacted] the two [redacted]
17 things. No, I can't recall.

18 Mr. Baron. I touched earlier upon the possibility of
19 disseminating derogatory information about Agency targets. These
20 were you aware of any general program of that nature to discredit
21 either a foreign political leader or a foreign political fac-
22 tion, or domestic political groups or leaders?

23 Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no. Domestic, I am
24 not aware of any.

25 I think the Soviet Russia division was quite active, and it

TOP SECRET

1 kept a list, for example, and maintained a very good list of
2 KGB officers abroad, and when one would show up at Luanda, for
3 example, they would make sure that the local press got the
4 man's dossier, or at least a blind handout so that they would
5 know who the fellow was, much as the Butz counterspy operation
6 is doing today against the CIA.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you make arrangements, or did you know
8 of arrangements being made for non-CIA authors to write pieces
9 that were favorable to the CIA?

10 Mr. Hunt. No.

11 Mr. Baron. There was no funding of that kind of opera-
12 ton?

13 Mr. Hunt. You mean sort of flackery, the favorable
14 publicity for the Agency, is that what you imply?

15 Mr. Baron. Right.

16 Mr. Hunt. No.

17 Mr. Baron. What about subsidizing non-CIA authors to
18 write stories of any sort, or books of any sort that the CIA
19 was interested in having published?

20 Mr. Hunt. I would say this in a qualified sense. Where
21 in the past we had given Praeger a commitment to buy X copies
22 of his book on the [redacted] problem, obviously
23 we were subsidizing the author of that book because it was
24 our money that Praeger was ultimately passing to the indi-
25 vidual, but that was Praeger doing it rather than us. In

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1 other words, there was never any face to face contact.

2 Mr. Baron. Aside from dealing through publishing houses
3 that you had established contact with, did you deal individually
4 with authors who were non-CIA employees?

5 Mr. Hunt. I did not. I don't think DOD did. I think that
6 Far East Division did.

7 Mr. Baron. Do you know with whom?

8 Mr. Hunt. You mentioned Chinese [redacted] for example.
9 Well, they dealt also, the Soviet Russia division dealt with
10 [redacted] on the Penkoski case. In fact, I had lunch with
11 [redacted] while he was doing the Penkoski Papers. So that was
12 an example.

13 Mr. Baron. Did they have a regular program?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes, I think so.

15 Mr. Baron. Both of those two divisions?

16 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

17 Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you think we would
18 need in order to have a fairly clear, complete picture of the
19 relations to the media or the publishing industry?

20 Mr. Hunt. Well, I think you could get probably a good
21 deal more information from Cord Myer, who had a lot of that
22 directly under him when he was Chief of the International
23 Organizations Division, and of course, he served as Deputy
24 Chief of Clandestine Services for quite a while. He would
25 probably have as panoramic knowledge as anybody. I guess he's

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1 was that we had made the -- the President had given certain
2 undertakings to Cuban leadership and to our own paramilitary
3 people, and had failed to carry them out.

4 However, this fact was successfully disguised for a number
5 of years, but Dulles and Dick Bissell paid the price.

6 In any events, the Bay of Pigs cost Dulles his leadership
7 of the Agency, and I had the utmost respect for him. I was
8 associated with him as an assistant for the special Cuban
9 Bay of Pigs purposes, for a period of several months prior to,
10 perhaps six months prior to his eventual retirement.

11 I had had occasional contacts with him as a **Chief of [redacted]**
12 **Station**, and I had seen him in Japan when he came over there
13 and we had some discussions. Mr. Dulles brought into the
14 formal Central Intelligence Agency the same feeling of esprit
15 de corps that we had all enjoyed in the Office of Strategic
16 Services, and this was largely lost during the McCone director-
17 ship. And I think we had some admiral after that, Admiral
18 Radford, possibly. We got under a group of managers, and the
19 human element that we had enjoyed in OSS was gone with the
20 passage of Allen Dulles until Dick Helms came back in. You
21 see, I'm an unrepentent admirer of Allen Dulles and the way we
22 used to do business. Why do I say that? Because the way we did
23 business during Mr. Dulles's directorate was precisely the way
24 we did it in OSS during General Donovan's creation and direction
25 of that organization. In OSS, which was Allan Dulles's training
ground as much

TOP SECRET

COPY: WILL

S E C R E T

Exhibit.7

FROM : MADRID
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INFO : DDP,VR *

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PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE MADR 1705

REF MADR 1681 IN 73706

[16 Sept 64]
IN 75100

1. CIA OFFICERS MET WITH SUEJ REF 15 SEPT. ONLY "IMPORTANT" INFO HE PROVIDED WAS VAGUE REFERENCE TO AGENT-1 PLAN ASSASSINATE CASTRO ATTEMPT WOULD SUPPOSEDLY TAKE PLACE DURING UNIVERSITY CEREMONY AT WHICH CASTRO PRESENT. AGENT-1 REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE ARRANGING DELIVERY CUBA ONE BELGIAN FAL EQUIPPED WITH SILENCER. AGENT-1 WAS TO BE TRIGGERMAN SUPPORTED BY UNIDEN-ARMY OFFICERS. ABOVE PLAN NOW APPARENTLY ABANDONED.

2. SAID AGENT-1 ANXIOUS LEAVE CUBA ON OFFICIAL VISIT ORDER CONTACT CIA RE HIS FUTURE ROLE WITH CUBA. SUBJ SUGGESTED REMOTE POSSIBILITY ARRANGE VISIT PRAGUE THRU AGENT-1 FRIEND JOSE, DELEG TO IUS. OUR IMPRESSION IS AGENT-1 WANTS COME OUT FOR GOOD AS PROBABLY FEELS PERSONAL SITUATION TENUOUS.

3. ACCORDING SUBJ, FOLL PERSONS OR INFLUENCE ON AGENT-1 TEAM. MAJOR, MAJOR AND EX-MAJOR (FNU).

4. SAID AGENT-2 HAS NUMEROUS CONTACTS CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCLES MADRID, PARIS, BUT WORKING FOR ANOTHER GOV'T. SINCE HE IN BAD STANDING WITH U.S.G. HINTED CIA SHOULD BE IN TOUCH AGENT-2 HOWEVER [REDACTED] HAS STRONG RESERVATIONS AGAINST AGENT-2 ON SECURITY GROUNDS

FROM

S E C R E T

AND FACT HE OUT FOR GOLD, PLUS LITTLE EVIDENCE CAPABILITY
PRODUCE INFO OF INTEREST.

5. [REDACTED] WHO LEFT MEETING FIRST, CLEARLY INFERRED TO SUBJ IT HAD BEEN "GREAT WASTE OF TIME." OTHER CIA OFFICER PROCEEDED POLITELY "CHEW OUT" SUBJ FOR GETTING US TO ABOVE MEET ON FALSE PRETENSES. SUBJ FRANKLY ADMITTED HIS "RECRUITMENT" BY CIS WAS HANDLED IN SUCH SLOPPY MANNER AS BE CONSTRUED A FARCE. VIEW VAGUENESS HIS MISSION AND LACK SECURE CONTACTS, REPORTING CHANNELS, IT APPARENT CIS NOT EXPECTING MUCH RESULTS FROM OP WHICH PROBABLY MADE ON "HIT OR MISS" BASIS. QUITE LIKELY "EDUARDO" WILL NEVER APPEAR TO CONTACT SUBJ.

6. SEEING HIS "UTILITY" TO US AS DUBIOUS, SUBJ BEGAN SCRATCHIN HEAD FOR LEADS AND MENTIONED FOLL "FRIENDS" HE MIGHT CONTACT: ORLANDO BLANCO (NO RELATION), CHARGE IN BERN WHO COMING [REDACTED] 5 SEPT; (ENU) TRASANCO OF PAIR EMB WHO CONFIDANTE AMALASH I ALSO KNOWN AMALASH [REDACTED] AND ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ LOECHES, AMB TO MOROCCO [REDACTED] MADRID [REDACTED]
20 SEPT.

7. C/O SAID NOW UP TO SUBJ SHOW BONAFIDES SUGGESTING HE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE HIS "UNIQUE STATUS" AS CUBAN AGENT GAIN ENTRY OFFICIAL CIRCLES. SUBJ FEARS WE MAY DENY VISA AND DENOUNCE HIM TO [REDACTED] POLICE. ALTHOUGH HE PROMISED MAKE EVERY EFFORT, INDICATIONS TO DATE ARE HE WILL HAVE LITTLE, IF ANY, OPS UTILITY. IN ANY EVENT WAS TOLD EXAMINE THOROUGHLY ANY LEADS HE MIGHT HAVE IN NEXT FEW DAYS. WE WILL DECIDE IN NEXT MEETING OR TWO WHETHER HE DOES APPEAR TO HAVE ANY UTILITY, IF NOT HE WILL BE DROPPED.

S E C R E T

RE [REDACTED] FROM *DISSEM APPLICABLE TO SENSITIVE CABLES

AUG 20 1975

CIA

S E C R E T

The \$86 roll of film from

Exhibit

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 1976

Retired Colonel Denies Heading C.I.A. Unit for Assassinations

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — A retired Army colonel has denied which he was temporarily assigned to Senate investigators an assertion by E. Howard Hunt Jr. that the colonel once headed a Central Intelligence Agency unit set up to arrange for the assassinations of suspected double-agents.

The colonel, Boris T. Pash, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence yesterday that during 1954 and 1955—the period in which Mr. Hunt, a former C.I.A. officer, was told that Colonel Pash had discussed with Colonel Pash at his superiors' behest, the prospective assassination of an individual who was believed to be a double agent. "I was told that we had ran such an operation—he had guy to see about this sort of left the C.I.A. and returned things was Colonel Pash."

In a statement made public by the panel today, Colonel Pash was deceased, added that Pash termed Mr. Hunt's assertions "insidious and completely false."

He said he could not recall ever having met or spoken with Mr. Hunt, who is serving a prison term for his role in the Watergate case.

Nor, the colonel said, was he ever "involved in any assassination planning," between spokesman said.

SPANISH TROOPS RUN SUBWAY IN MADRID

MADRID, Jan. 7 (AP)—The Spanish Army began running the Madrid subway system to-day as the Government moved gingerly to break a three-day wildcat strike that set off the worst traffic snarl in the city's history.

Fearing a possible labor backlash, the Government refrained for the moment, however, from drafting the rebellious subway workers into service.

About 3,000 electric company workers marched into the center of Madrid in support of the subway workers and the police used tear gas to disperse them. The police said they broke up similar demonstrations by factory workers on the city's outskirts. No arrests or injuries were reported.

Army personnel trained as railroad engineers reopened the main subway line, which runs

through the center of the capital between working-class neighborhoods. Passengers were admitted free.

MADRID, Jan. 7 (Reuters)—Striking Madrid subway workers tonight voted to defy Government pressure and to continue their walk-out. Strike leaders said they would hold out until their wage demands were met.

The strikers voted not to accept an offer from the official Government-run union to hold talks if they returned to work.

BARCELONA, Spain, Jan. 7 (AP)—The Rev. Luis Maria Xirinachs, an outspoken Roman Catholic priest nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize last year, was arrested today while demonstrating near the local prison in support of amnesty for political prisoners, police sources said.

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!

V
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of Sa

MISSES
SEASIDE
STYLE

Find the latest
single and double issues
...pick from plenty of
want. We even have some

MISSES' AN

Discover dra-
single and double issues



A printed two-piece

STATEMENT BY E. HOWARD HUNT

A year ago when Congress established the Church Committee, Senator Baker was quoted as saying that I would be an early witness. I was then free on Appeal and readily available to testify concerning CIA involvement in allegedly illegal activities. Moreover, I viewed testifying before the opportunity Committee as a further/to testify under oath concerning my total non - involvement with Messrs Oswald, Bremer and Sirhan, persons with whom my name has been slanderously and libelously linked in press and electronic media. Although I had been interviewed previously by the FBI and the Rockefeller Commission with regard to these allegations a host of assassination buffs and media advocates continued irresponsibly to associate me with the deaths of the Kennedy brothers and the crippling of Governor Wallace.

My Appeal denied, I re-entered prison in April, 1975. Three weeks later US Marshals escorted me to Washington DC for what turned out to be a three-hour interview with a new Watergate Assistant Special Prosecutor. For a 9-day period I was lodged at the Leesburg, Va., jail, and finally returned via Detroit and Tallahassee where I was imprisoned in the isolation area before being driven on May 26 to Eglin Federal Prison Camp. On May 27, Assistant Committee Counsel Michael Madigan telephoned me to say that the Church Committee wanted to interview me "within the next two weeks". I apprised Mr. Madigan of Public Law 93-209, Title 18. Sec.4082(c) Para. 1 (amended) which authorizes minimum security prisoners such as myself to be furloughed for up to 30 days for purposes of testifying. Counsel Madigan agreed to my testifying on this furlough basis.

Over the summer, however, I heard nothing further from Mr. Madigan or his Committee associates. Then in mid-September a Washington POST story alleged that I had been assigned by a White House superior to assassinate columnist Jack Anderson. Senator Church was thereupon quoted as saying that his Committee would investigate the charges. I welcomed this apparent

opportunity, for the allegations had gained wide credence while my own delayed response appeared only incompletely in the press. Still, nothing was heard from the Committee.

In December 1975 John Crewdson of the New York Times interviewed me in prison. He asked if I knew anything about "CIA assassination capabilities", and I related to him my encounter with Col. Boris T. Pash. Mr. Crewdson then inquired whether the Church Committee had interviewed me. I responded in terms of the foregoing, noting that I would have testified about the Pash encounter had I been given the publicized opportunities. My interview with Mr. Crewdson was published and shortly thereafter my attorney was contacted by a representative of the Committee.

I consider it highly discriminatory that the Committee is unwilling to have me testify in Washington as a furloughed witness. Further, the Committee's refusal to postpone interviewing me in prison until one of two counsel familiar with my career and affairs is available places me in a difficult position with regard to representation by informed legal counsel. And, as during the Ervin Committee hearings (whose cost in legal fees to me approached \$100,000) I must again pay legal fees occasioned by the interest of the Senate in a matter of no discernible benefit to me.

Between last January and April I could freely have traveled to Washington to testify at the pleasure of the Senate. From then on I could have been furloughed for that purpose and testified accompanied by customary counsel who are not now available to me. Nevertheless, in demonstration of my willingness to cooperate fully with the Senate I agree to be interviewed under oath today.



E. Howard Hunt







Exhibit 3



P/I STAFF

Exhibit 4





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